Contents

Introduction. 1

The Application is Consistent With the Public Interest 2

Relation to Litigation in the United States 3

Conclusion. 3

Endnotes 3

Introduction

On November 14, 2025, the Australian Competition & Consumer Commission (ACCC) received an application for authorization from Google and Epic to settle their antitrust litigation in Australia (Application).^[1] The settlement requires Google to, first, allow third-party app stores to be seamlessly installed and distributed on Android; second, permit developers to steer users to payment platforms other than Google Play Billing; and third, cap the service fees Google charges for transactions in apps downloaded or updated from Google Play for new installs at 9 or 20 percent, depending on the app and transaction.^[2]

The Application details three provisions to implement the second and third of these requirements. These provisions include, first, specific limits on the Google Play Service Fees that Google can charge for certain categories of apps and types of transactions or purchases in specified conditions; second, terms that set out how alternative payment options in addition to Google Play Billing must be made available; and third, how Google is allowed to inform users, in a neutral way and with the option to opt-out of future prompts in this manner, that external payment links will take them outside of Google’s ecosystem.^[3]

The Information Technology and Innovation Foundation (ITIF) is a nonprofit, nonpartisan research and educational institute that has been repeatedly recognized as the world’s leading think tank for science and technology policy.^[4] ITIF engages in policy and legal debates, both directly and indirectly, by presenting policymakers, courts, and other stakeholders with data-driven analysis and proposals to advance effective innovation policies. To this end, ITIF has filed several amicus briefs in the Epic v. Google U.S. litigation.^[5]

ITIF submits that the Application should be accepted by the ACCC as a more than sufficient remedy to address competition concerns in the app store market, as evidenced by Epic’s own consent to the proposal. Moreover, the ACCC should not consider the Application insufficient by virtue of the fact that it does not include all the relief ordered in the U.S. litigation, and in particular the additional catalog sharing proposal, which as explained in further detail below, is highly flawed and need not be adopted here.

The Application is Consistent With the Public Interest

The Application’s remedial provisions more than sufficiently address the conduct by Google that was found to be anticompetitive. As distinct from the series of payments to developers and OEMs that were deemed to have limited the distribution of alternative app stores on Android, Google was principally found to have acted anticompetitively through a “payments tie” between Google Play Store and Google Play Billing, whereby use of the Play Store was “conditional upon app developers not acquiring payment solutions for accepting and processing payments for Play Store app in-app purchases from any person other than Google.”^[6] By requiring that Google allow developers to offer alternative payment methods “side-by-side with Google Play Billing based on fair UX guidelines,” the Application provides redress for this behavior by giving users and developers more choice for payment solutions while simultaneously attempting to mitigate the adverse effects on user experience and Google’s incentives to compete in mobile payments.^[7]

Second, Google’s “anti-steering rule,” which prevented developers from “creat[ing] links to out-of-app payment solutions within their Play Store apps,” was seen as an unlawful way to “strengthen and protect the payments tie by preventing developers who are required to use Google Play Billing from leading users to a payment method other than Google Play Billing.”^[8] Accordingly, the Application stipulates that developers will be able to “offer users the option to complete digital transactions through in-app links to external payments on websites.”^[9] Moreover, in an attempt to ensure that the adverse effects of this provision on the integrity, privacy, and security of Google’s platform are minimized, the Application allows Google to take measures such as “show[ing] an information screen that communicates that the user will be going to an external website to conclude the purchase of digital content,” as well as “review[ing] external links solely for compliance with reasonable Trust and Safety Requirements to protect users and their payment data and to address any illegal or harmful content on the destination page.”^[10]

In addition to undoing the behavior that was determined to be anticompetitive, antitrust remedies often include further, targeted measures designed to restore competition and benefit consumers so as to counteract the purported abuse of market power. Here, Google was found to have a “substantial degree of market power” that would allow it to charge high prices.^[11] To that end, the Application includes a number of limitations on the fees that Google may charge for various services it provides through Google Play.^[12] Importantly, the Application also makes clear that “Google may separately charge for services provided by Google Play Billing, and this application does not relate to fees for those services.”^[13] To be sure, while it is prudent to be wary of remedies that take the form of de facto regulation—particularly relief that involves determining the prices that a company may charge—the Application reflects a negotiated settlement between Google and Epic that seeks to benefit developers with lower prices without unduly chilling Google’s incentives or ability to compete and innovate on its platform.

Relation to Litigation in the United States

The Epic v. Google matter in Australia has occurred in tandem with analogous litigation in the United States, where Epic has sued Google on similar grounds, alleging that various payments to developers and OEMs, as well as the alleged tying of Google Play Billing to the Google Play Store, were anticompetitive. Earlier this year, the U.S. courts affirmed relief that included measures designed to ensure that consumers could access third-party app stores on Android, as well as measures enabling developers to provide users with information and access to alternative billing options.^[14] In addition, the U.S. remedies included a catalog sharing provision that requires Google to “‘permit third-party Android app stores to access the Google Play Store's catalog of apps,’ so that competing app stores can offer users a comparable library of software products.”^[15] As the court explained, the central purpose of this remedy was not to put an end to Google’s anticompetitive behavior, but instead deny Google “the fruits of its statutory violation.”^[16]

That this remedy was imposed in the United States in no way implies that the Application is inadequate. Indeed, the catalog access remedy is highly flawed. First, as ITIF has explained, not only was it true that the “conduct deemed illegal in this case did not involve any claim that Google acted anticompetitively by failing to provide rivals with catalog access,” but there was no causal connection between a catalog sharing remedy and undoing the network effects Google’s allegedly anticompetitive conduct purportedly created as distinct from the network effects it achieved through the other common, myriad procompetitive behaviors it undetakes on its platform; second, as ITIF has also made clear, “Google has invested heavily into building its Play Store catalog and this sort of forced sharing would discourage incentives to innovate not just for Google, but also for the third-party app stores who are able to free ride off Google’s catalog rather than pursue competitive advantage through competition on the merits.”^[17]

Conclusion

The Application presented by Epic and Google should be approved as a means to settle their longstanding antitrust litigation, and Australia need not be concerned that the flawed catalog sharing remedy in the United States is not a part of it. Indeed, as Australia considers whether it requires additional regulatory powers to police anticompetitive conduct in digital markets, the Epic v. Google litigation and accompanying Application demonstrate that the enforcement of its existing competition laws is sufficient to address concerns about anticompetitive behavior in digital markets and redress harms in a way consistent with the public interest.

Thank you for your consideration.

Endnotes